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The following presentation is an attempt to depict in a systematic form the fundamental ideas of my book Soziale Klassen und Klassenconflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1957). However, the presentation departs significantly in its organization and thematic scope from that given in my book: (1) whereas the book binds together theoretical considerations and empirical analysis, the present exposition is essentially limited to the theoretical aspects; (2) whereas in the book I have developed the theoretical orientations in a critical dialogue with other authors, particularly with Marx, the presentation in the following exposition is systematic. It need hardly be elaborated that much of what is expressly developed in the book could be only formally treated here and often with dogmatic brevity. Nevertheless, it may be noted that the present exposition, especially in the first and fourth sections, contains in certain respects formulations beyond the scope of the book. At this time, approaches toward a systematic study of social conflict are still relatively isolated, compared with the innumerable works on social stratification or on structure and function of specific institutions, organizations, and societies. Still the thesis of a revival of the study of social conflict can be justified with regard to the works of Aron, Philip, Brinton, Kerr, Coser, Brinkmann, Geiger, Gluckmann, and others,3 as Africa (London, 1957).
well as an attempt to determine a systematic locus and a specific framework for a theory of conflict in sociological analysis.
TYPES AND VARIETIES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT
To begin with a commonplace observation: The problem of conflict is no less complex than that of integration of societies. We now know that the attempt to reduce all actually occurring conflicts among social groups to a common principle, say that of classes, is sterile. It leads either to empty generalizations (such as "Every society experiences social conflicts") or to empirically unjustifiable oversimplifications (such as "The history of all societies so far has been a history of class struggles"). It seems advisable, first, to sort out and to classify the problems which are conceived under the general heading of "social conflict." Even a superficial reflection leads to the distinction of a series of types.
There are wars, and there are conflicts among political parties-evidently two different kinds of struggle. With regard to a given society, A, one could say there are exogenous conflicts brought upon or into A from the outside, and there are endogenous conflicts generated within A. Of these two categories, which, at least analytically, can be relatively precisely distinguished, there are again several types. Let well as an attempt to determine a systematic locus and a specific framework for a theory of conflict in sociological analysis.
There are wars, and there are conflicts among political parties-evidently two different kinds of struggle. With regard to a given society, A, one could say there are exogenous conflicts brought upon or into A from the outside, and there are endogenous conflicts generated within A. Of these two categories, which, at least analytically, can be relatively precisely distinguished, there are again several types. Let attention for the moment-for reasons which will presently be given-to endogenous conflicts. Then further subdivisions are directly perceived: slaves versus freemen in Rome, Negroes versus whites in the United States, Protestants versus Catholics in the Netherlands, Flemings versus Walloons in Belgium, Conservatives versus Laborites in England, unions versus employers in many countries. All these are opposing groups in well-known conflicts. Perhaps each of these examples does not fall into a separate category; but certainly they cannot all be subsumed under a single type of social conflict. Whatever criterion one chooses for classification-for example, the objects of contention, the structural origin of the conflicting groups, the forms of conflict-several distinct types result.
THE LIMITS AND GOALS OF A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT
An ideal sociology cannot, in principle, exclude any of these categories and types of conflict from analysis. Nevertheless, the types mentioned do not all have the same importance for sociological analysis. A brief recollection of the intent of a sociological theory of conflict reveals that the contribution of sociology to the understanding of conflict (as well as the contribution of conflict to the social process) is in specific instances greater in some cases than in others.
The intent of a sociological theory of conflict is to overcome the predominatingly arbitrary nature of unexplained historical events by deriving these events from social structural elements-in other words, to explain certain processes by prognostic connections. Certainly it is important to describe the conflict between workers and employers purely as such; but it is more important to produce a proof that such a conflict is based on certain social structural arrangements and hence is bound to arise wherever such attention for the moment-for reasons which will presently be given-to endogenous conflicts. Then further subdivisions are directly perceived: slaves versus freemen in Rome, Negroes versus whites in the United States, Protestants versus Catholics in the Netherlands, Flemings versus Walloons in Belgium, Conservatives versus Laborites in England, unions versus employers in many countries. All these are opposing groups in well-known conflicts. Perhaps each of these examples does not fall into a separate category; but certainly they cannot all be subsumed under a single type of social conflict. Whatever criterion one chooses for classification-for example, the objects of contention, the structural origin of the conflicting groups, the forms of conflict-several distinct types result.
The intent of a sociological theory of conflict is to overcome the predominatingly arbitrary nature of unexplained historical events by deriving these events from social structural elements-in other words, to explain certain processes by prognostic connections. Certainly it is important to describe the conflict between workers and employers purely as such; but it is more important to produce a proof that such a conflict is based on certain social structural arrangements and hence is bound to arise wherever such 171 171 171 RALF DAHRENDORF RALF DAHRENDORF RALF DAHRENDORF structural arrangements are given. Thus it is the task of sociology to derive conflicts from specific social structures and not to relegate these conflicts to psychological variables ("aggressiveness") or to descriptive-historical ones (the influx of Negroes into the United States) or to chance.
In the sense of strict sociological analysis, conflicts can be considered explained if they can be shown to arise from the structure of social positions independently of the orientation of populations and of historical dei ex machina. This is necessarily a very abstract formulation; instead of elaborating it, it may be advisable to illustrate its meaning by the following treatment of a form of social conflict. First, however, let us draw a consequence of this formulation which will help to make our problem more precise.
Since the recognition of the inadequacy of the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism, the explanation of exogenous conflicts on the basis of the structure of a given society is once again an open problem, the treatment of which has scarcely begun. It seems, moreover, that the explanation of exogenous conflicts4 by the tools of sociological structure analysis is possible only in a metaphorical sense-namely, only in case the entire societies (or less comprehensive "social systems") are taken to be the units of a new structure,5 that is, when C is analyzed in terms of the structure of its elements A and B without consideration of the inner structure of A and B. On these grounds it seems sensible to exclude exogenous conflict for the time being from a theory of social conflicts.
On the other hand, the above-mentioned examples of endogenous conflict, if consid- 4 We recall here that a conflict which, from the point of view of Society A, appears as exogenous is represented from another point of view as a conflict between two societies or systems, A and B. structural arrangements are given. Thus it is the task of sociology to derive conflicts from specific social structures and not to relegate these conflicts to psychological variables ("aggressiveness") or to descriptive-historical ones (the influx of Negroes into the United States) or to chance.
On 1. Every society is subjected at every moment to change: social change is ubiquitous.
2. Every society experiences at every moment social conflict: social conflict is ubiquitous.
3. Every element in a society contributes to its change.
4. Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others.
The remarkable nature of our vantage point becomes evident when we examine the two groups of postulates with respect to their truth content, that is, if we ask ourselves which of the two models promises greater utility for cognition of reality. It appears that the juxtaposed pairs of postulates are in no way mutually exclusive with respect to social reality. It is impossible to decide by an empirical investigation which of the two models is more nearly correct; the postulates are not hypotheses. Moreover, it seems meaningful to say that both models are in a certain sense valid and analytically fruitful. Stability and change, integration and conflict, function and "dysfunction,"
9 There is much controversy over this implication of the structural-functional approach. Most functionalists deny that they make such an assumption. Indeed, assertions to the contrary are found in the works of Parsons, Merton, and others. Nevertheless, it can be shown that these assertions are, from the point of view of structural-functional theory, mere declarations. The notion of equilibrium and the concept of a system would have little sense if they did not make the assumption of stability of societies. However, two limitations are to be observed: (1) we have to do here (also in the implications which follow) not with a metaphysical postulate but rather with an assumption made for the purpose of analysis; and (2) stability does not mean statics in the sense of complete absence of processes within the "system." takes the diametrically opposite position on all the four points above:
1. Every society is subjected at every moment to change: social change is ubiquitous.
9 There is much controversy over this implication of the structural-functional approach. Most functionalists deny that they make such an assumption. Indeed, assertions to the contrary are found in the works of Parsons, Merton, and others. Nevertheless, it can be shown that these assertions are, from the point of view of structural-functional theory, mere declarations. The notion of equilibrium and the concept of a system would have little sense if they did not make the assumption of stability of societies. However, two limitations are to be observed: (1) we have to do here (also in the implications which follow) not with a metaphysical postulate but rather with an assumption made for the purpose of analysis; and (2) stability does not mean statics in the sense of complete absence of processes within the "system."
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consensus and constraint are, it would seem, two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society. They are dialectically separated and are exhaustive only in combination as a description of the social problems. Possibly a more general theory of society may be thought of which lifts the equivalidity of both models, the coexistence of the uncombinable, onto a higher level of generality. As long as we do not have such a theory, we must content ourselves with the finding that society presents a double aspect to the sociological understanding, each no better, no more valid, than the other. It follows that the criticism of the unapplicability of the structural-functional theory for the analysis of conflict is directed only against a claim of generality of this theory but leaves untouched its competence with respect to the problem of integration. It follows, on the other hand, also that the theory of conflict and change is not a general theory. Comparisons between natural and social sciences always carry the danger of misunderstanding. However, it may be maintained, without attributing to this analogy more than a logical meaning, that the situation of the sociologists is not unlike that of the physicists with respect to the theory of light. Just as the physicists can solve certain problems only by assuming the wave character of light and others, on the contrary, only by assuming a corpuscular or quantum theory, so there are problems of sociology which can be adequately attacked only with an integration theory and others which require a conflict theory for a meaningful analysis. Both theories can work extensively with the same categories, but they emphasize different aspects. While the integration theory likens a society to an ellipse, a rounded entity which incloses all of its elements, conflict theory sees society rather as a hyperbola which, it is true, has consensus and constraint are, it would seem, two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society. They are dialectically separated and are exhaustive only in combination as a description of the social problems. Possibly a more general theory of society may be thought of which lifts the equivalidity of both models, the coexistence of the uncombinable, onto a higher level of generality. As long as we do not have such a theory, we must content ourselves with the finding that society presents a double aspect to the sociological understanding, each no better, no more valid, than the other. It follows that the criticism of the unapplicability of the structural-functional theory for the analysis of conflict is directed only against a claim of generality of this theory but leaves untouched its competence with respect to the problem of integration. It follows, on the other hand, also that the theory of conflict and change is not a general theory. Comparisons between natural and social sciences always carry the danger of misunderstanding. However, it may be maintained, without attributing to this analogy more than a logical meaning, that the situation of the sociologists is not unlike that of the physicists with respect to the theory of light. Just as the physicists can solve certain problems only by assuming the wave character of light and others, on the contrary, only by assuming a corpuscular or quantum theory, so there are problems of sociology which can be adequately attacked only with an integration theory and others which require a conflict theory for a meaningful analysis. Both theories can work extensively with the same categories, but they emphasize different aspects. While the integration theory likens a society to an ellipse, a rounded entity which incloses all of its elements, conflict theory sees society rather as a hyperbola which, it is true, has consensus and constraint are, it would seem, two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society. They are dialectically separated and are exhaustive only in combination as a description of the social problems. Possibly a more general theory of society may be thought of which lifts the equivalidity of both models, the coexistence of the uncombinable, onto a higher level of generality. As long as we do not have such a theory, we must content ourselves with the finding that society presents a double aspect to the sociological understanding, each no better, no more valid, than the other. It follows that the criticism of the unapplicability of the structural-functional theory for the analysis of conflict is directed only against a claim of generality of this theory but leaves untouched its competence with respect to the problem of integration. It follows, on the other hand, also that the theory of conflict and change is not a general theory. Comparisons between natural and social sciences always carry the danger of misunderstanding. However, it may be maintained, without attributing to this analogy more than a logical meaning, that the situation of the sociologists is not unlike that of the physicists with respect to the theory of light. Just as the physicists can solve certain problems only by assuming the wave character of light and others, on the contrary, only by assuming a corpuscular or quantum theory, so there are problems of sociology which can be adequately attacked only with an integration theory and others which require a conflict theory for a meaningful analysis. Both theories can work extensively with the same categories, but they emphasize different aspects. While the integration theory likens a society to an ellipse, a rounded entity which incloses all of its elements, conflict theory sees society rather as a hyperbola which, it is true, has the same foci but is open in many directions and appears as a tension field of the determining forces.
THE TASKS OF A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT
The double aspect of society and the dialectics of the two types of sociological theory are in themselves a most fruitful object of reflection. Nevertheless, another problem seems to be more urgent. The theory of social integration has recently developed to a flourishing state as the structural-functional approach in ethnology and sociology. Our theory of conflict, however, is still in a very rudimentary state. It is an approach based on postulating ubiquitous social change and social conflict, the "dysfunctionality" of all the elements of social structure, and the constraining character of social unity. Our considerations put us in a position to formulate some requirements of such a theory:
1. It should be a scientific theory (as is the theory of social integration), that is, it should be formulated with reference to a plausible and demonstrable explanation of empirical phenomena.
2. The elements of the theory should not contradict the conflict model of society.
3. The categories employed should, whenever possible, agree with those of the integration theory or at least correspond to them.
4. A conflict theory should enable us to derive social conflicts from structural arrangements and thus show these conflicts systematically generated.
5. It should account both for the multiplicity of forms of conflict and for their degrees of intensity.
The last goal of a social theory is the explanation of social change. The integration theory gives us a tool for determining the same foci but is open in many directions and appears as a tension field of the determining forces.
The last goal of a social theory is the explanation of social change. The integration theory gives us a tool for determining which prevail within certain units of social organization. For these units I will use Max Weber's concept of "imperatively co-ordinated group." The thesis is not new; it is found (however often with important modifications) in the formulation of many social scientists before and after Marx. But we shall make no attempt to trace the history of this thesis.
AUTHORITY AND AUTHORITY

STRUCTURES
The concepts of power and authority are very complex ones. Whoever uses them is likely to be accused of lack of precision and of clarity to the extent that he tries to define them "exhaustively." Is the influence of a father on his children, the influence of an industrial combine on the government, or the influence of a demagogue on his followers an instance of an authority relation? Here, as in most other cases, it is basically not a question of a definition but rather a question of an "operational definition," as it is often called today: a method of determination which allows us to identify as such the state of affairs when we are actually confronted with it. However, for the purpose of analysis and identification, Weber's determination of authority is sufficient: "The likelihood that a command of a certain content will be obeyed by given persons"l' This determination contains the following elements:
1. Authority denotes a relation of supraand subordination.
2. The supra-ordinated side prescribes to the subordinated one certain behavior in the form of a command or a prohibition.
3. The supra-ordinated side has the right to make such prescriptions; authority is a legitimate relation of supra-and subordina- which prevail within certain units of social organization. For these units I will use Max Weber's concept of "imperatively co-ordinated group." The thesis is not new; it is found (however often with important modifications) in the formulation of many social scientists before and after Marx. But we shall make no attempt to trace the history of this thesis.
AUTHORITY AND AUTHORITY
STRUCTURES
AUTHORITY AND AUTHORITY
STRUCTURES
3. The supra-ordinated side has the right to make such prescriptions; authority is a legitimate relation of supra-and subordina- 14 The position of authority of the bureaucrat was already of concern to Max Weber and to many sociologists since. Here there seems to be indeed a differentiation of authority. However, it is a differentiation of a special kind. In modem bureaucratic administration, the exercise of authority has undergone to a certain degree a division of labor; hence the multiplicity of positions, distinguishable by the number of "assignable persons" and the scope of "specific content" to which authority privileges are attached.
In the sense of our analysis, there can be no doubt that the entire bureaucracy belongs (at times!) to the ruling side. 15 In what follows, I shall designate the roles to which the expectation of the exercise of authority is attached as "positive dominance roles" and, conversely, the roles without authority privileges as "negative dominance roles." only general ("civil") basic rights and those which have authority rights over the former. In contrast to prestige and income, a continuum of gradual transition cannot be constructed for the distribution of authority. Rather, there is a clear dichotomy. Every position in an imperatively co-ordinated group can be recognized as belonging to one who dominates or one who is dominated. Sometimes, in view of the bureaucratic large-scale organization of modern societies-under the influence of the state -this assumption may at first sight seem problematic. However, a sharper analysis leaves no doubt that here also the split into the dominating and dominated is valid, even though in reality a considerable measure of differentiation is discernible among those in the dominating group.14 THE CONFLICT-THEORY MODEL The dichotomy of social roles within imperatively co-ordinated groups,15 the division into positive and negative dominance roles, is a fact of social structure. If and insofar as social conflicts can be referred to this factual situation, they are structurally explained. The model of analysis of social 14 The position of authority of the bureaucrat was already of concern to Max Weber and to many sociologists since. Here there seems to be indeed a differentiation of authority. However, it is a differentiation of a special kind. In modem bureaucratic administration, the exercise of authority has undergone to a certain degree a division of labor; hence the multiplicity of positions, distinguishable by the number of "assignable persons" and the scope of "specific content" to which authority privileges are attached.
In the sense of our analysis, there can be no doubt that the entire bureaucracy belongs (at times!) to the ruling side. This sort of analysis evidently tells us little that we already do not know; it seems, after decades of industrial conflict, almost trivial. Therefore, I have expressly designated it as an illustration of conflict theory. Neverthe-17 It should be recalled that the description of a social organization as an imperatively coordinated group is not exhaustive, nor should it be so. Rather, this description singles out for analysis one aspect of social organizations. For this reason, the statement "This social organization is an imperatively co-ordinated group" is not a tautology. This sort of analysis evidently tells us little that we already do not know; it seems, after decades of industrial conflict, almost trivial. Therefore, I have expressly designated it as an illustration of conflict theory. Neverthe-17 It should be recalled that the description of a social organization as an imperatively coordinated group is not exhaustive, nor should it be so. Rather, this description singles out for analysis one aspect of social organizations. For this reason, the statement "This social organization is an imperatively co-ordinated group" is not a tautology. dustrial enterprise is, among other things,l7 an imperatively co-ordinated group. It contains positions with which are associated an expectation and a right of exercising authority and other positions whose occupants are subjected to authority. There are managers of many grades, and there are workers. The authority of managers is institutionalized and legitimate. It is guaranteed by legalistic and quasi-legalistic sanctions (disciplinary fines, demotion, dismissal, etc.). A conflict of (latent) interests between managers and workers is thus structurally unavoidable. Therefore, we can formulate the assumption that, from these quasi-groups, interest groups emerge as soon as the conditions of organization (communication within the quasigroups, regulated recruiting into the quasigroups, freedom of coalition, leaders and ideologies, technical means) are on hand. The emerging interest groups are employers' associations and trade unions. The conflict between these interest groups varies in its intensity in direct relation to the conditions of conflict, especially to the degree of mobility from one group to another and to the presence of effective mechanisms for regulating conflicts (channels for collective bargaining, arbitration institutions, etc.). This conflict leads-either through negotiations or through strikes-finally to changes in the structure of industrial organizations and in the position of the involved groups.
This sort of analysis evidently tells us little that we already do not know; it seems, after decades of industrial conflict, almost trivial. Therefore, I have expressly designated it as an illustration of conflict theory. Neverthe-17 It should be recalled that the description of a social organization as an imperatively coordinated group is not exhaustive, nor should it be so. Rather, this description singles out for analysis one aspect of social organizations. For this reason, the statement "This social organization is an imperatively co-ordinated group" is not a tautology. less, even this illustration is not entirely trivial when we realize two of its implications: if conflict theory is useful, then it follows that industrial conflict exists regardless of whether the managers are owners-entrepreneurs or whether they are agents elected by bodies of stockholders, or whether they are government officials; that is, relationships of ownership in principle do not affect either the existence or the intensity of industrial conflicts. Furthermore, it follows that industrial conflict is present even if the complete system of its regulation has been realized. Regulation influences, it is true, the intensity of the conflict, but no mechanism is imaginable which abolishes conflicts altogether.
Consequences of this sort suggested by applications of conflict theory are by no means trivial. In the face of two burning problems of sociological analysis, this assertion should be justified, at least in outline.
THE PROBLEM OF CO-DETERMINATION
It is now evident that co-determination in the German coal and steel industry has not led to the abolition, not even to alleviation, of industrial conflict. On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that all the involved groups expected that co-determination would bring such a result about. How can we explain this discrepancy? Under the assumptions and in the light of conflict theory, an explanation is indeed possible: industrial organization is an imperatively co-ordinated group. Social conflicts between the bearers of positive and negative dominance roles are unavoidable in it. Co-determination means, above all, the elevation of workers' representatives into management positions, that is, a change of certain persons from negative to positive dominance positions (Aufsichtsrat, Arbeitsdirektor). These changes leave the authority structure of industrial organization as a structure of positions with command functions unchanged. Co-determinaless, even this illustration is not entirely trivial when we realize two of its implications: if conflict theory is useful, then it follows that industrial conflict exists regardless of whether the managers are owners-entrepreneurs or whether they are agents elected by bodies of stockholders, or whether they are government officials; that is, relationships of ownership in principle do not affect either the existence or the intensity of industrial conflicts. Furthermore, it follows that industrial conflict is present even if the complete system of its regulation has been realized. Regulation influences, it is true, the intensity of the conflict, but no mechanism is imaginable which abolishes conflicts altogether.
It is now evident that co-determination in the German coal and steel industry has not led to the abolition, not even to alleviation, of industrial conflict. On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that all the involved groups expected that co-determination would bring such a result about. How can we explain this discrepancy? Under the assumptions and in the light of conflict theory, an explanation is indeed possible: industrial organization is an imperatively co-ordinated group. Social conflicts between the bearers of positive and negative dominance roles are unavoidable in it. Co-determination means, above all, the elevation of workers' representatives into management positions, that is, a change of certain persons from negative to positive dominance positions (Aufsichtsrat, Arbeitsdirektor). These changes leave the authority structure of industrial organization as a structure of positions with command functions unchanged. Co-determina- The above analysis, because of its almost superficial brevity, is wide open to many kinds of critical objections. Therefore, we shall break it off at this point, with the assertion that a strict and detailed application of conflict theory to the problem of co-determination enables us to make the indicated assumptions sufficiently precise that they can be subjected to empirical tests. The same holds for a second problem of outstanding actual importance, which will be briefly analyzed here from the perspective of conflict theory: the problem of conflict and of change in totalitarian states.
19 The dogmatic brevity of the present analysis can give rise to misunderstandings. What is meant here is that conflict theory offers a conclusion to the effect that the intensity of social conflict is at a minimum where the conflict as such is taken seriously and is pursued most energetically, for example, in United States industry. Conversely, all attempts to erase the lines of conflict by institutions such as co-determination threaten, contrary to their intent, to sharpen conflicts. The oft repeated question of Sombart, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" finds an answer not in the vague notion of the "American way of life" but in the generally positive value attached to conflict in the United States. pants of positive dominance positions and, as such, stand, as a result of structural necessity, on the other side of the barrier that separates up from down. Somewhat pointedly expressed: not only has co-determination failed to make industrial conflict milder, but it has at the same time robbed the occupants of the negative dominance positions of their representation, that is, it has blocked a channel of expression of the conflict. There is thus the danger that the existing latent conflict will create new, completely unregulated, forms of expression and will assume more radical forms when the representatives of the workers perceive their task as representatives of interests in an unambiguous and radical manner.19
The above analysis, because of its almost superficial brevity, is wide open to many kinds of critical objections. Therefore, we shall break it off at this point, with the assertion that a strict and detailed application of conflict theory to the problem of co-determination enables us to make the indicated assumptions sufficiently precise that they can be subjected to empirical tests. The same holds for a second problem of outstanding actual importance, which will be briefly analyzed here from the perspective of conflict theory: the problem of conflict and of change in totalitarian states.
19 The dogmatic brevity of the present analysis can give rise to misunderstandings. What is meant here is that conflict theory offers a conclusion to the effect that the intensity of social conflict is at a minimum where the conflict as such is taken seriously and is pursued most energetically, for example, in United States industry. Conversely, all attempts to erase the lines of conflict by institutions such as co-determination threaten, contrary to their intent, to sharpen conflicts. The oft repeated question of Sombart, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" finds an answer not in the vague notion of the "American way of life" but in the generally positive value attached to conflict in the United States.
